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DISPOSITION OF THE IRRESPONSIBLE: 
PROTECTION FOLLOWING COMMITMENT 
Travis H. Lewin* 
EACH year more of our fellow citizens are involuntarily committed to a mental institution of one sort or another than are incarcer-
ated for the commission of a crime.1 To those committed, the walls 
and barred windows of the hospital, as well as the treatment and 
mode of living, are probably not significantly different from those 
of a prison. This is particularly the case with those confined for treat-
ment by court order or by some special statutory procedure follow-
ing acquittal of a crime on grounds of insanity. Yet these mentally 
ill, even after perpetrating what would otherwise have been a crim-
inal act, are not criminals; their involuntary stay in the hospital is, 
at least in part, intended for their own protection and treatment, not 
as punishment for their actions.2 
Another reason for their commitment lies, of course, in the soci-
etal interest in protecting the general populace from those persons 
who have shmvn themselves to be dangerous.3 Those who commit 
antisocial acts, whether we choose to brand them as criminals or 
excuse them because they are so ill that reason and rational motiva-
tion are impossible, may have an enhanced potential for committing 
future acts dangerous to others.4 As our attitudes toward criminal 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Syracuse. B.A. 1958, Southern State 
College; LL.B 1958, University of South Dakota; S.J.D. 1967, University of Michigan. 
Research for this article was made possible through funds derived from gifts from 
William W. Cook and the General Electric Corporation to the University of Michigan 
Law School.-Ed. 
I. See Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. 
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
11 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. 
2. See People v. Nunes, 58 Ill. App. 2d 55, 207 N.E.2d 143 (1965). See also Com-
ment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 
(1967); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134, 1139-40 (1967); cf. 
Rice, Mental Capacity To Stand Trial-Part II, Constitutional Issues, I WASHBURN L. 
REv. 176, 179 (1961). 
3. See s. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 122 (1962); H. WEIHOFEN, THE URGE To 
PUNISH 118-19 (1956); Figinski, Commitment After Acquittal on Grounds of Insanity, 22 
Mo. L. REv. 293, 298 (1962); Comment, Compulsory Commitment Following a Success-
ful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 409, 421 (1961). See also Overholser v. O'Beime, 
302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); 
State v. Toon, 172 La. 631, 135 S. 7 (1931). 
Involuntary commitment procedures, other than those statutes providing for 
automatic commitment following an insanity acquittal, typically require a judicial 
finding that the subject is, in fact, "dangerous." If this, rather than protection or 
treatment of the committed, is the proper rationale, the standard of proof to justify 
detention for treatment should be correspondingly higher. See Note, Civil Commit-
ment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1288, 1291 (1966). 
4. It has been pointed out, however, that there is no empiric evidence that the 
[721] 
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responsibility become more liberal and the concept of legal insanity 
expands,11 this society-protection interest is likely to emerge in a 
provision for the commitment to a mental hospital of all those acquit-
ted on grounds of insanity. 6 Indeed today, although not all states 
provide for automatic commitment-that is, commitment immedi-
ately following an insanity acquittal without a hearing of further 
evidence or a finding as to the subject's present state of mind-com-
mitment typically follows an insanity acquittal in most of the courts 
in this country.7 
mentally ill are any more dangerous to society than the mentally healthy. Hearings 
at 270. 
5. See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 241 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ("It is 
simply that an accused is not responsible if his unlawful act was the product of 
mental disease or defects."). This definition, however, has subsequently been tight-
ened. See Hightower v. United States, 325 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1963); McDonald v. 
United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 
(D.C. Cir. 1957). 
6. The District of Columbia automatic commitment statute, for example, was 
enacted in direct response to the Durham decision. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 
705, 715 (1962); Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity 
Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 941-42 (1961). 
7. This is the common procedure in every American jurisdiction with the possible 
exception of the federal courts outside the District of Columbia. See H. WEIHOFEN, MEN-
TAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 365 (1954). Although legislation now pending would 
provide for automatic commitment in federal courts outside the District of Columbia 
[S. 3689, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 17033, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)], no such 
procedure is currently authorized. Rather, most federal courts have taken the position 
that they must release the defendant after an insanity acquittal. Pope v. United States, 
372 F.2d 710, 731 (8th Cir. 1967); Freeman v. United States, 357 F.2d 606, 625 (2d Cir. 
1966); Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962); Sauer v. United States, 241 
F.2d 640, 651 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957); Dixon v. Steele, 104 F. Supp. 
904 (W".D. Mo. 1951). See also United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). 
Contra, Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1960). 
The state statutes which provide for commitment following an insanity acquittal 
are of two types: "automatic" and "non-compulsory." Under the "automatic" variety 
(sometimes termed "mandatory" or "compulsory'1, the trial court has no discretion 
whatsoever following an insanity acquittal, but must commit the defendant to an ap-
propriate institution. See Figinski, supra note 3; Comment, supra note 3. Seventeen 
jurisdictions now have this sort of automatic scheme: Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts (murder and manslaughter cases only), 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Wisconsin, the 
District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands. 
The remainder of the states provide for some form of noncompulsory commitment 
after an insanity acquittal, but the provisions take on a variety of forms. Seventeen 
states eschew any specified commitment procedure, leaving it entirely up to the dis-
cretion of the trial court: Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Massachusetts 
(cases other than murder and manslaughter), New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and 
West Virginia. Other states furnish commitment standards and require that either 
the judge or jury make a specific finding as to commitment-either at trial or at a 
separate hearing, which then becomes mandatory: Alabama, Arizona, California, 
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. A few states have a 
variant of this last procedure, leaving it to the court's discretion whether to cause 
an inquiry into the defendant's mental state following an insanity acquittal, but pro-
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The various state procedures for commitment following an in-
sanity acquittal raise a whole range of questions, from their consti-
tutionality to their wisdom and efficacy.8 Intelligent analysis of these 
methods of disposition of the irresponsible cannot, of course, ignore 
any of these questions. One inquiry, however, has seldom been made 
and seems of especially great import today: if mandatory commit-
ment is to be justified on the basis that society has a right to at least 
a reasonable period of close examination to insure that the defen-
viding that the court be bound thereafter by the results of the inquiry: Idaho, Louisiana 
(noncapital felonies and misdemeanor cases), and Tennessee. And, of course, some 
statutory schemes do not fit even these categorizations. E.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, 
§§ 7, 8(a) (1957). These two sections have not yet been judicially reconciled, but seem 
to provide that if the jury acquits and finds that the defendant continues to be insane, 
commitment is mandatory. If, however, the jury acquits on insanity grounds but 
neglects to make such a finding, the court apparently has discretion to order commit-
ment. 
8. For representative literature on some of these questions, see generally M. 
GUTI'MACHER &: H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952); F. LINDMAN &: D. 
MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE LAW (1961); T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND 
PsYCHIATRY (1963); Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 
57 MICH. L. REv. 945 (1959); Comment, supra note 2; Note, supra note 3. 
Perhaps at the core of the problem is the fact that the philosophy and administra-
tion of the commitment-following-insanity statutes have changed but little in the 
168 years since the attempted assassination of King George III by a mentally deranged 
Englishman, one Hadfield, prompted the first automatic commitment statute. See 
Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281 (1800), 40 Geo. 3, ch. 94 (1800). Only a small 
minority of American states, for example, have established procedures for an adequate 
psychiatric examination of the defendant either before or after commitment. Only 
three states require that the accused be given a psychiatric examination within a 
prescribed period after commitment or provide for periodic examinations: Georgia, 
Louisiana, and Missouri. Only two of the automatic commitment states provide for 
a hearing on the question of recovery before commitment: Hawaii by statute, HAWAII 
REv. LAws § 258-38 (Supp. 1963), and Ohio by judicial decision, Collins v. Campbell, 4 
Ohio App. 2d 42, 211 N.E.2d 96 (1965). In an important case decided while this 
article was in galley, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, drawing 
from Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), held that although a defendant may 
be automatically committed following an insanity acquittal for a period of time 
sufficient for examination and determination of his present mental condition, failure 
to provide a judicial hearing at the end of this period would be a denial of equal 
protection of the laws. That is, some judicial procedure corresponding to that for 
civil commitment must be afforded. Bolton v. Harris, 36 U.S.L.W. 2,535 (D.C. Cir. 
Feb. 1, 1968) (Bazelon, C.J.). This case may presage a reexamination of the consti-
tutionality of automatic commitment statutes. Furthermore, no jurisdiction with an 
automatic commitment statute has seen fit to provide the indigent defendant with an 
attorney to represent and assist him during his period of confinement, although most 
states provide an attorney to help with a specific petition or hearing. E.g., Robertson v. 
Cameron, 224 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1963) (attorney provided at hearing in absence of 
statutory provision); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2260 (1964) (counsel for indigents at 
civil commitment hearings). Only one state has provided the automatically committed 
indigent with funds to hire a psychiatrist of his own choice. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 39-8-4(16) (Supp. 1965). Some courts have, however, indicated that they would appoint 
such experts for indigent patients. Watson v. Cameron, 312 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1962); 
People ex. rel. Anonymous No. 1 v. La Burt, 17 N.Y.2d 738, 217 N.E.2d 31 (1966). It 
seems apparent, then, that as of this writing, the aims of the states are something other 
than rehabilitative. 
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dant can be safely returned to the community and if continuing 
hospitalization is premised upon the need to treat him until he is no 
longer dangerous to himself or to others, is the patient being released 
promptly upon qualifying for discharge? Does the law or medical 
practice afford the patient adequate assistance in implementing his 
treatment and rehabilitation? If these are answered in the negative, 
is there any remedy? 
These questions are brought into sharp focus by the recent deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
Rouse v. Cameron/! In that case, the same court which adopted an 
expanded notion of legal insanity in Durham10 held that a person 
committed under the District of Columbia automatic commitment 
statute had a judicially enforceable statutory, and perhaps constitu-
tional, right to treatment for his illness. The court declared that 
failing adequate treatment, the hospital must release him, and it 
reserved to itself the question of what is "adequate" in a particular 
case.11 The court further intimated that were there not such a right 
to treatment, the statute might be unconstitutional on due process, 
equal protection, or cruel and unusual punishment grounds. Just as 
Durham stirred members of the legal and medical professions to re-
examine and re-evaluate the question of criminal responsibility,12 so 
should Rouse activate consideration of the care and treatment of 
those deemed irresponsible. 
With this in mind, the writer participated in a study of inmates 
who were committed to a Michigan hospital for the criminally in-
sane after an insanity acquittal. The study unearthed some troubling 
abuses of the treatment process. It demonstrated that patients with-
out competent legal assistance were often abandoned in the hospital, 
spending many months and years beyond the time when they could 
and should have been released. It demonstrated that the judicial ma-
chinery sometimes deliberately and sometimes negligently inter-
ferred with treatment programs. Yet, significantly, it also showed that 
when patients were able to retain competent and active attorneys to 
protect their interests, these abuses were kept to a minimum. It is the 
9. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The holding of Rouse was presaged by earlier 
warnings that failure to provide suitable treatment might call into question the valid-
ity of the automatic commitment statute. See Brown v. Cameron, 353 F.2d 835, 837 
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion); Darnel v. Cameron, 348 F.2d 64, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). 
IO. See note 5 supra. 
11. The court, moreover, ruled that "continuing failure to provide suitable and 
adequate treatment cannot be justified by a lack of staff or facilities." 373 F.2d at 457. 
12. See, e.g., Hearings at 433-64, 685-93, 753-96; GLUECK, supra note 3, at 41-103; S. 
RUBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL LAW 1-86 (1965); WEIHOFEN, supra note 3; Moore, 
M'Naghten is Dead-or Is It?, 3 HousroN L. REv. 58, 62-76 (1965); Slovenko, Psychiatry, 
Criminal Law and the Role of the Psychiatrist, 1963 DuKE L.J. 395, 398-424. 
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thesis of this article that the availability of legal counsel is essential 
to the effective enforcement of the post-commitment rights of pa-
tients committed after insanity acquittals. 
I. THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE 
The study focused particularly on the twenty-nine persons com-
mitted under the Michigan automatic statute since 1939.13 At the 
time of the study, 1965-1967, that statute applied only to those ac-
quitted of murder by reason of insanity, although it has since been 
broadened to cover all "crimes."14 In addition, occasional reference 
is made to data concerning inmates who were acquitted of charges 
less than murder, and who were committed under other than the 
automatic procedures. It is important to note that the conclusions 
of this study are equally applicable to all types of commitment proce-
dures following an insanity acquittal. 
A. Treatment Failures 
In reading this section, the warning of the Rouse court should be 
remembered: failure to provide adequate treatment might render a 
commitment statute constitutionally suspect. Treatment failures, 
then, might threaten the foundation of the entire scheme.15 
The patients studied were hospitalized at the Michigan State 
Hospital for the Criminally Insane at Ionia (hereinafter referred to 
as Ionia). In 1965, the Michigan State Department of Mental Health 
authorized a medical audit investigation of Ionia which resulted in a 
recommendation that the hospital be phased out and that in the 
future persons eligible for commitment be sent to any of several 
regional hospitals which treat the noncriminal mentally ill.16 The 
basic criticism of the audit was that the hospital had wholly failed 
to carry out its function of providing treatment to inmates. The in-
vestigation revealed: (1) that the hospital had been unable to attract 
physicians with the necessary medical and psychiatric skill and legal 
sophistication;17 (2) that nurses were so fearful of the patients that 
13. The study was conducted during the period 1965-1967 at the Michigan State 
Hospital for the Criminally Insane at Ionia, Michigan [hereinafter referred to as Ionia] 
and culminated in a report to the state mental health department. J. ACHER, R. GUZMAN 
& T. LEWIN, PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS IN CRIMINAL CAsES-A FIELD STUDY AND REPORT 
TO THE MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH (1967). 
14. Public Act No. 266, [1966] Mich. Acts 378, repealing MICH. CoMP. LAws 
§ 766.15c (1948). Section 27b of the Act extends automatic commitment to all "crimes." 
15. See 373 F.2d at 453; Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960). 
16. Unpublished Final Report of the Ionia State Hospital Medical Audit Committee 
of October 4, 1965. Copy on file with the author. 
17. The Medical Audit Committee noted that during the period of the study the 
doctor/patient ratio at Ionia was in the neighborhood of 300:I. Id. at 3-4. 
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they would not visit the wards at night even when medication was 
needed, leaving the matter of the administration of drugs to the 
guards; (3) that the physical plant was so old, of such poor design, 
and in such bad repair as to preclude modern psychiatric practice;18 
(4) that opportunities for occupational, industrial, or recreational 
therapy were almost wholly lacking due to the foregoing reasons; 
and (5) that, perhaps influenced by the fact that it operated in a 
small rural community near two state correctional institutions, the 
treatment program was primarily custodially oriented and that super-
vision of patients by professional personnel was minimal. 
While Ionia, unlike some other mental institutions,19 cannot 
justifiably be termed a "hell-hole," the shortages of facilities and 
staff have adversely affected the treatment afforded the patients. Our 
examination of the Ionia patient records revealed numerous exam-
ples of treatment failures. In some cases, patients had not been 
thoroughly psychiatrically examined for years on end. In others, 
years went by without patients even being observed in a "staffing 
conference"-wherein the patient's history and progress are re-
viewed by the hospital staff for counseling purposes. In one case, 
through apparent neglect, the hospital failed to follow up the 
scarcely arduous therapeutical recommendations of an experienced 
outside psychiatrist; predictably, the juvenile patient involved 
suffered a deteriorated mental condition. In another case, even 
though an inmate acquitted of murder had been recommended by 
the superintendent for release into the community, a security atten-
dant cancelled all his athletic team therapy because someone forgot 
to amend the outdated "homicidal" label on his records jacket. Most 
of these sorts of treatment failures should in truth be attributed to 
understaffed and overcrowded hospital conditions, rather than to 
negligence, as such, on the part of the staff. 
Negligence can, however, be attributed to the legal profession 
for hindering the treatment program in two respects: incorrect prep-
aration of commitment orders and direct judicial interference in the 
hospital treatment program. It was not uncommon to find that the 
18. The physical plant was characterized as "depressing overcrowded firetraps in 
which no one should be required to live." Id. at 3-4. 
19. See State v. Gremillion, 168 S.2d 270, 273 (La. App. 1964). See also Hearings at 
40-47 (testimony of Albert Deutsch); Halleck, A Critique of Current Psychiatric Roles 
in the Legal Process, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 379. Several commentators have indicted the 
nation's hospital system for the criminally insane as little more than a vast penal hold-
ing compound, with more emphasis on security than treatment of any kind. E.g., 
RUBIN, supra note 12, at 41-42, 149-66 (1965); SZAsz, supra note 8, at 144; Goldstein &,: 
Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decision To Re-
lease Persons Acquitted By Reasons of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 226-27 (1960); Halleck, 
supra at 392; Comment, supra note 3, at 417, n.24 (1961). 
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commitment order drafted by an attorney or a judge incorrectly 
stated the reason for the commitment. In fact, for the period 
from 1959 to 1964, twenty-seven erroneous or ambiguous court 
orders were found which misled the hospital as to the patient's legal 
status and which may have resulted in the application of wrong treat-
ment goals. In one case, a patient was actually acquitted of a crime 
less than murder but the commitment order stated that he was in-
competent to stand trial-a different legal status and one which has 
different treatment objectives.20 In another case, a man charged with 
simple assault was found incompetent to stand trial and ordered 
committed. The commitment order, however, referred only to his 
mental condition at the time of the alleged criminal act and ordered 
that he be kept in confinement for his "natural life," a term reserved 
by statute exclusively for defendants acquitted of murder by reason 
of insanity. The hospital duly classified him as a "natural life in-
mate" and handled him as if he had been acquitted of murder and 
was homicidal. The effect of this sort of misclassification is not diffi-
cult to see: since the standard for competency to stand trial is lower 
than that of safe return to the community-the standard that must 
be achieved by "natural-life inmates"21-such a misclassified patient 
will likely remain committed longer than is necessary. 
It was also not uncommon for courts to interject their edicts into 
the treatment process by attempting to define or restrict the type of 
activity that a patient should be permitted to engage in while at the 
hospital. One court, for example, appended to its commitment order 
the notation that the defendant was dangerous and should not be 
given outside privileges. Hospital personnel advised that they would 
abide by the court's directive if to do so would not interfere with the 
patient's treatment and would countermand the order only where 
they felt it necessary to do so.22 Consequently, this patient would re-
ceive therapeutically valuable outside privileges only when "neces-
sary" and not when merely desirable, as is the test for other patients. 
20. The hospital was thus working toward the objective of returning the inmate 
so that he could stand trial instead of preparing him for release to the community. 
Since it is possible for a mental patient to reach a point in his recovery where he can 
safely be returned for trial but where he is not yet progressed to the point where he 
may be returned to the community, such an error risks premature release. 
21. In theory one can be mentally ill and dangerous to himself and to others, yet 
still be competent to stand trial. For discharge of an automatically committed "nat-
ural life" patient, he must be found "not [to] be harmful to other persons or their 
property." MICH. COMP. LAws § 766.15c (1948). Under the competency test, however, 
the defendant need only be "capable of understanding the nature and objects of the 
proceedings against him and of comprehending his own condition in reference to 
such proceedings and of assisting in his defense in a rational and reasonable manner." 
MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.Z/ (1948) • .Both of these statutory provisions were replaced 
by Public Act No. 266, [1966] Mich. Acts 378. See also text following note 30 infra. 
22. Interviews with A. A. .Birzgalis, Superintendent of the Ionia State Hospital 
Administrative and Medical Staff Personnel, July 26, 29, 1966. 
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It should be apparent that such judicial restrictions may constitute 
an unwarranted interference with the hospital's primary role in 
treatment. 
The types of treatment abuses discussed in this section point up 
the significance of the right to treatment recognized by Rouse. Yet 
the mere existence of the right is not meaningful without an effec-
tive means of enforcing it. As will be discussed in more detail later, 
effective enforcement depends upon the availability of an attorney 
to act on behalf of the patient. 
B. Detention Beyond the Point of Cure 
The most dramatic abuse noted in the Ionia study was the reten-
tion in confinement, for substantial periods, of patients who were 
apparently eligible for discharge. Significantly, the incidence of such 
prolonged unnecessary confinement was greater where the patient 
was without counsel; in those cases in which a private attorney was 
retained, the abuse was minimized. 
For each of the twenty-nine murder defendants, an insanity ac-
quittal meant commitment to Ionia until such time as he should 
become sufficiently restored to mental health to be able to re-
join the community. The mechanics of the study required, first, 
that the point of medical eligibility for release be determined in 
each individual case. It was then a simple matter to compute the 
patient's period of confinement subsequent to that point. From a 
study of the patient files for each of the twenty-nine, it was deter-
mined that the hospital, as a matter of routine, would generally 
inaugurate discharge or cooperate with discharge efforts whenever 
the patient's condition stabilized for a period of about six months, 
as observed and reported by the ward attendants, nurses, and staff 
psychiatrists, provided that the patient was no longer psychotic or 
otherwise mentally ill.23 Where the patient was not psychotic on ad-
mission, discharge efforts would be made when it appeared that the 
patient was free of emotional disturbance, had gained "insight" into 
his crime, and was generally cooperative with hospital personnel. 
The time interval from this point of eligibility for discharge to 
actual discharge, or if no such discharge occurred, then to October 
31, 1966, was determined in two classes of cases: those where the 
patient had the active assistance of an attorney during commitment 
and those where the patient lacked such assistance. 
23. This practice was confirmed by a file study of approximately fifty incompe• 
tency-to-stand-trial patients, which at that time were subject to the same "restored to 
sanity" standard for discharge as those automatically committed. Ionia staff personnel 
were also consulted and agreed that our findings as to the discharge pattern were 
substantially correct. Interview with Ionia Medical Staff personnel, October 25, 1966. 
February 1968] Disposition of the Irresponsible 729 
The study revealed that twelve of the twenty-nine patients had 
been discharged, one died, and the remainder were still in the hos-
pital. Only one patient secured a release without the active assistance 
of an attorney and she spent six and one-half years in the hospital 
beyond the eligibility point. The other eleven securing release had 
attorneys active in their behalf and were discharged within an aver-
age of four and one-half months from the eligibility point. Compari-
son of the total hospitalization time revealed an even more striking 
disparity. Excluding six patients whose commitment period was too 
short for meaningful comparison from our total of twenty-nine, the 
ten patients without legal assistance spent an average of over tw-elve 
years in the hospital,24 while the thirteen with attorneys spent an 
average of one year and ten months there. This is a difference of 
nearly ten years. It should be noted, however, that three of the pa-
tients without legal assistance had such severely defective mental con-
ditions that they were untreatable and no amount of legal assistance 
would have affected the length of their stay in the hospital. With 
these three patients excluded, the difference is still startling: those 
without active legal assistance spent an average of seven years and 
seven months at Ionia-five years and nine months longer than the 
patients with legal help. 
Seven of the patients were released within one year of their com-
mitment, and three of these within only three months, notwith-
standing the hospital's general practice of requiring six month's 
stabilization. All seven had attorneys active in their behalf. Of those 
patients without attorneys who were not so severely ill as to be 
untreatable, six had attained the eligibility point for discharge and 
at the very least should have received an independent psychiatric 
examination to determine if they could safely be released. Yet as of 
October 31, 1966, these patients had spent an average of one year 
and ten months in Ionia beyond the point where they had appar-
ently recovered. The average total hospitalization time for the thir-
teen patients with attorneys was a few days less than that. 
These statistics indicate that there is a clear danger of prolonged 
commitment of non-mentally ill patients. They show that the patient 
who did not have legal assistance, either because of financial inabil-
ity25 or because he was a juvenile and lacked sufficient experience to 
enable him to retain an attorney, was denied equivalent access to the 
24. This includes patients not discharged as of October 31, 1966. 
25. In some of the cases it could not be determined from the files whether the 
patient was financially unable to obtain private counsel. It may be that funds 
were available but that the inmate's mental condition precluded any sort of initiative 
on his part or that his attempts were thwarted by relatives or hospital authorities. 
The latter was noted in at least one case history. 
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channels of discharge. Such a denial, in the case of patients who 
could medically and legally qualify for release if given an opportu-
nity, is a most serious invasion of a patient's constitutional rights: 
for by reason of invidious economic discrimination, it deprives him 
of his most precious freedom-liberty of his person.26 Not only is 
this violative of basic notions of due process and equal protection, 
but it arguably constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Most 
courts have sustained commitment schemes against this latter chal-
lenge on the theory that the commitment is civil, not criminal.27 
But even this labeling device must fail after the patient has recov-
ered from his illness, since he no longer needs treatment nor presents 
a danger to society. 
The hypothesis that the most logical safeguard consists of an 
active attorney representing the patient can perhaps best be illus-
trated by two actual Ionia case histories. 
Case History "A." The patient was admitted to Ionia in 1940 fol-
lowing an insanity acquittal of murder and was diagnosed as having 
a "situational psychosis," "hysterical amnesia," and an "introverted 
personality." Although she had periodic contacts with her family, 
who retained an attorney, he was not active on her behalf, and she 
had no independent resources. Eight years after her admission, 
during which time she made steady progress, the hospital found her 
no longer psychotic. Her condition remained substantially un-
changed for six more years. At that time the hospital concluded she 
could be discharged but advised her that only the Governor could 
set her free, and they notified her attorney that they were setting in 
motion administrative procedures which would culminate in the 
Governor acting to release her. The attorney took no active steps to 
gain her release and seven months went by before the Attorney Gen-
eral advised the hospital that the Governor would not act to pardon 
her. The attorney then obtained a writ of habeas corpus and the 
patient was ordered released by the court. 
At the very least, this patient remained at Ionia eight months beyond 
the point when the hospital formally determined she should be re-
leased; since her condition had not changed in the six years pre-
ceding this determination, it is likely that she was confined almost 
seven years too long. Compare her plight with that of the well-to-do 
industrialist in the following illustration. 
Case History "B." The defendant, a wealthy industrialist, was 
automatically committed following an insanity acquittal on the 
charge of murdering his wife, whom he caught with an alleged par-
amour. The defendant retained three of the leading forensic psychia-
26. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
27. E.g., In re Golden's Petition, 341 Mass. 672, 171 N.E.2d 473 (1961). 
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trists in the country to testify at his trial. On admission to Ionia he 
was found to be suffering from a personality trait disturbance without 
psychosis. Two days later he was seen by a private psychiatrist, and his 
attorney moved for a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus which was 
actively resisted by the State. A compromise was reached whereby 
the patient was ordered committed to a Detroit clinic for a month of 
observation and study. The clinic examination resulted in a finding 
of no psychosis, although he was classed as an emotionally unstable 
person. On his return, his attorney secured a hearing on the writ, 
and six private psychiatrists testified that he was not psychotic and 
would not be harmful to society if released. Although the superin-
tendent of Ionia testified against the release, the court ordered his 
discharge. 
By actively working on behalf of his client, over the objections of 
the hospital superintendent and the prosecutor, the attorney was 
able to effect a discharge within four months from the initial com-
mitment. 
This comparison points up the effectiveness of the attorney in 
this sort of representational role. The lawyer who was successful in 
obtaining a timely discharge from Ionia for his client generally took 
most, if not all, of the following steps: (I) he made early contact with 
the Ionia Superintendent assuring him that the inmate's family de-
sired his return and that proper facilities existed for the successful 
transition to freedom; (2) he made regular contacts with the patient, 
including personal visits; (3) he saw to it that members of the 
patient's family made frequent and regular visits both with the pa-
tient and the hospital staff; (4) he employed private psychiatrists and 
obtained periodic psychiatric examinations; (5) he discussed the pa-
tient's progress with the staff psychiatrist; and (6) he expeditiously 
moved for a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus whenever it appeared 
that either the private psychiatric testimony clearly supported a dis-
charge or the Superintendent no longer actively opposed a release.28 
In short, one could perhaps best characterize the attorney's role as 
that of an expert catalyst and champion. 
While the necessity for this sort of individual action implies that 
the hospital was less than diligent in fulfilling its duty of treatment 
and return of the patient, it would be unfair to place the blame 
solely with the hospital. On several occasions the hospital had to do 
all the work necessary to secure the release, and since there is no 
28. The writ of habeas corpus was the only judicial method available for discharge. 
The Superintendent did not have power to release a patient automatically committed 
as the statute provided that only the Governor with the advice of the Mental Health 
Commission could discharge these patients. MICH. COMP. LAws § 766.15c (1948), 
repealed by Public Act No. 266, [1966] Mich. Acts 378. Not one person was discharged 
by the Governor during the twenty-eight years the statute was in operation. 
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legal staff attached to the hospital, it was forced to turn to the Attor-
ney General for legal assistance. The very fact that the Attorney 
General is obligated to act on behalf of the State to insure that a 
release is not improvident and will not endanger society would tend 
to put him in a position of serving two masters. It is reasonable to 
assume that the State will not act as quickly or as zealously in the 
sole interests of the patient as would a private lawyer. Another focal 
point of inertia is in the hospital staff itself. Every time a released 
patient commits an act of violence, the hospital comes under severe 
public censure and criticism. During the period of the study, Ionia 
was the subject of three separate public investigations, culminating 
in the recommendation that it be closed. Fighting for its very exis-
tence, there was every reason for the hospital to delay a patient's 
discharge until the staff was "absolutely certain of his harmlessness 
to society." 
II. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL 
It might be argued that a proposal for legislative reform in this 
area is like calling the fire department to put out a lighted match. 
After all, in twenty-eight years under the statute there were only 
twenty-nine automatic commitments in one of the largest states in 
the country. A related pilot study of the problems of the criminally 
mentally ill in Michigan, however, revealed that a considerable in-
crease in commitments following insanity acquittals is likely to occur 
in the future. The study noted that for many years Michigan prose-
cutors have been using the incompetency-to-stand-trial procedure 
as a convenient but improper disposition of criminal cases.20 
Faced with a mentally ill defendant, it became the practice in many 
Michigan courts for the prosecution to raise the issue of incompe-
tency and actively to work for pretrial commitment, often over the 
objection of the defense. Many courts required nothing beyond a 
showing of the existence of mental illness and a psychiatrist's recom-
mendation of needed hospitalization to support its finding of in-
competency.30 
An incompetency commitment was a valuable prosecutorial device 
because the Ionia staff until late 1965 interpreted the relevant stat-
ute to require them to retain custody of the defendants until they 
were completely "cured" of their mental illness. As a result many 
such defendants were kept for treatment even though their mental 
29. J. ACHER, R. GUZ1'rAN 8: T. LEWIN, PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS IN CRIMINAL CAsEs 
36 (1967). 
30. Id. at 43. 
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condition had improved to the point at which the requirements for 
competency would have been satisfied. When these defendants were 
finally returned for trial, the charges would ordinarily be dismissed 
and the defendants released.31 
As a result of a series of outside investigations, the hospital re-
evaluated its interpretation of the incompetency treatment goals and 
began to return defendants to trial when they could meet the legal 
test of competency irrespective of the continuance of the underlying 
mental illness.32 The result was a marked increase in insanity acquit-
tals and subsequent commitment. Prior to the 1965 shift in the hos-
pital's position, commitments following insanity acquittals averaged 
less than four per year; there were fourteen in the first ten months 
of 1966 alone. Further, the pre-1965 yearly average of less than one 
automatic commitment following an insanity acquittal of murder, 
was quickly surpassed when ten such commitments were made in the 
first ten months of 1966. There is evidence that many of these trials 
resulting in insanity acquittals were little more than informal hear-
ings before the judge. After the prosecutor established an uncon-
tested prima facie case, he would stipulate that mental illness existed 
at the time of the offense. Thus the defendant would be quickly 
acquitted and recommitted. 
Although this Michigan experience is primarily a reaction to an 
unusual situation, it does indicate that proper utilization of the in-
competency process coupled with the availability of automatic com-
mitment, may result in increased irresponsibility commitments. A 
similar increase in prosecutive use of the insanity defense recently 
occurred in the District of Columbia for different reasons,33 and 
with the increased availability of defense funds to indigents and 
expanded understanding and use of psychiatric concepts by lawyers, 
31. For example, of the 180 defendants committed to Ionia from Detroit Recorder's 
Court who were returned to that court during fiscal 1966, 88% had their charges 
dismissed. Id. at 20. This was similar to the practice of many other state courts before 
and during this period. 
32. IONIA STATE HOSPITAL, A STUDY OF PATIENTS RETURNED TO COURT BY THE IONIA 
STATE HOSPITAL AS COMPETENT To STAND TRIAL AS OF AUGUST 31, 1966 (1966) (unpub-
lished report to the Michigan Department of Mental Health). See also Hess 8: Thomas, 
Incompetency To Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and Problems, 119 AM. J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 713-20 (1963); Note, Criminal Law-Insane Persons-Competency To Stand Trial, 
59 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1961). 
33. Krash, supra note 6, at 949-51. Insanity acquittals in the District of Columbia 
went from none in 1951 to ten in 1955, fourteen in 1956, and thirty in 1959. Krash 
attributed this rise to the adoption of the more liberal Durham rule for insanity in 
that jurisdiction. At the same time, incompetency commitments diminished markedly 
from a yearly figure of between forty-five and sixty to only thirteen by 1963. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CmcuIT, REPORT 0,F THE COMMI'IT.EE ON 
PROBLEMS CONNEcnD ·wITH MENTAL ExAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES 
BEFORE TRIAL 156 (1965). 
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the incidence of insanity acquittals may well increase generally 
across the country. 
But irrespective of the increase the hospital is now under greater 
pressure to treat the ill and discharge the cured. There is no enforce-
ment mechanism for these duties other than the courts-indeed, the 
lesson of Rouse is that the courts will enforce the duty to treat the ill 
as they have long enforced the duty to discharge the recovered. The 
most effective means of providing enforcement is to insure that at-
torneys are available to all patients committed after an insanity 
acquittal, regardless of their financial means. An alternative solution 
might be to provide periodic judicial review of each patient's case. 
This, however, would be unnecessary in a number of cases, signifi-
cantly complicate hospital routine, and unduly burden already con-
gested court dockets. As the Michigan study demonstrated, the assis-
tance of an attorney representing the inmate on a continuing basis 
is more than adequate. 
To implement such a broad and, in some respects, radical pro-
gram, legislation is required. A model statute, appended hereto, is 
therefore proposed to provide any person committed after insanity 
acquittal with complete, continuing legal representation, including 
the ability to hire private psychiatric or other expert help when ap-
propriate. The statute is drafted with but one class of patient in 
mind-those who are committed following an insanity acquittal. It 
may be that other classes or indeed all inmates ought to have the 
same protection. This would depend, in my view, upon whether they 
are abandoned much in the same manner as the Michigan inmate 
acquitted by reason of insanity. It is here that the need is most 
critical. 
APPENDIX 
A PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE 
Section 1. Title. An act to provide for the representation of 
indigent persons committed to a mental institution following ac-
quittal of a crime because of insanity, during the period of their 
commitment or while under the supervision of the said mental 
institution. 
Section 2. (a) Right to an Attorney. In every criminal case in 
which the defendant is acquitted by court or jury of the crime 
charged on the grounds [of insanity] [that he was not legally respon-
sible for his act by reason of mental illness existing at the time of 
the act] and who shall therefore be committed to a mental institution 
shall be entitled to be represented by an attorney during the entire 
February 1968] Disposition of the Irresponsible 735 
period of his confinement and any period of parole, temporary re-
lease, conditional release or convalescent care, until unconditionally 
discharged from confinement in accordance with law. 
(b) Appointment of Counsel. The committing court, following 
acquittal by reason of insanity, if satisfied after an appropriate in-
quiry that the defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel, shall 
appoint counsel to represent him. 
(c) Duration and Substitution of Counsel. A defendant for whom 
counsel is appointed shall be represented throughout the period of 
commitment to the custody of the hospital including any period of 
parole, temporary release, conditional release, or convalescent care. 
If at any time after the appointment of counsel, the court making 
initial appointment finds that the defendant is financially able to 
obtain counsel or to make partial payment for the representation, 
he may terminate the employment of counsel or authorize partial 
payment as the interests of justice may dictate. If at any time during 
confinement, either the committing court, or the court situate in 
the county where the defendant is confined or is a resident if on 
parole, temporary release, conditional release or convalescent care, 
finds that any person committed in the manner described in subsec-
tion (a) is financially unable to pay for counsel he had previously re-
tained, the court may appoint counsel as provided in subsection (b) 
as the interests of justice may dictate. Either of said courts may, at 
any time during the aforesaid period of custody or supervision, in 
the interests of justice substitute one appointed counsel for another. 
(d) Payment for Representation. An attorney appointed pursuant 
to this section shall at the end of the representation, or semiannually 
in the event that the representation extends six months or more, be 
compensated at a rate not exceeding $15 per hour for time spent in 
any court or administrative hearing and $10 per hour for time rea-
sonably spent out of court and shall be reimbursed for expenses 
reasonably incurred. Each claim shall be supported by a written 
statement specifying the time spent, services rendered, and expenses 
incurred and, in addition, any compensation or reimbursement ap-
plied for and received on behalf of the said patient from any other 
source. Upon submission for approval to the court making the ap-
pointment, the court shall in each instance fix the compensation and 
reimbursement to be paid to the attorney. Compensation for time 
spent out of court, exclusive of reimbursement of expenses, to an 
attorney under this Act shall not exceed $150 in any six-month 
period. Compensation for time spent in court or in an administra-
tive hearing shall not exceed $250 in any six-month period. In extra-
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ordinary circumstances payment in excess of the limits set forth 
herein may be made if the court making the appointment certifies 
that such payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for pro-
tracted representation and the amount of the excess payment is ap-
proved by a judge of an appellate court. In the event of representation 
of the inmate in any appellate proceedings the attorney shall be 
entitled to receive in compensation and in addition to any other 
compensation such sums as may be approved in the discretion of the 
appellate court but in no event to exceed the sum of $250 together 
with reimbursement of any expenses reasonably necessary to prose-
cute such appeal. 
(e) Services Other Than Counsel. Counsel for any inmate com-
mitted in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) unable to 
obtain expert or other services necessary to reviewing the inmate's 
mental condition and recuperative progress while in the custody or 
under the supervision of the hospital may request such services by 
an application to the committing court or the court making the ap-
pointment of counsel. Upon finding after appropriate inquiry that 
the services are necessary and that the inmate is financially unable 
to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel to obtain the ser-
vices on behalf of the inmate. The court shall determine reasonable 
compensation for the services and direct payment to the organization 
or person who rendered them upon a filing of a claim for compensa-
tion supported by an affidavit specifying the time spent, services 
rendered and expenses incurred on behalf of the inmate and any 
compensation received for the same services from any other source. 
The compensation to be paid to a person for such services rendered 
by him to an inmate under this subsection, or to be paid to an orga-
nization for such services rendered by an employee thereof, shall not 
exceed $250 in any six-month period, exclusive of reimbursement 
for expenses reasonably incurred. 
(f) Payment Source. Payment of compensation to the attorney or 
for the services set forth in subsection (e) together with expenses 
reasonably incurred shall be made by the County Treasurer of the 
county wherein the appointment was made. The county shall be 
entitled to reimbursement of such payment from the state. 
(g) The term "inmate" as used in this section means the defen-
dant committed to a hospital following acquittal of a crime by 
reason of insanity. 
